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TREATIES - "ACCIDENT" UNDER THE WARSAW
CONVENTION-NINTH CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT A PREEXISTING MEDICAL CONDITION, ALONG WITH A
FLIGHT ATTENDANT'S FAILURE TO ACT,
CHARACTERIZES AN "ACCIDENT"
UNDER THE WARSAW CONVENTION:
HUSAIN V. OLYMPIC AIRWAYS
MELINDA SCISSORS CONLEY*

HE WARSAW CONVENTION 1 affords a passenger the sole
compensatory remedy for injuries caused by an "accident"
on an international flight. 2 Air France v. Saks held that an "accident," under the Warsaw Convention, is an "unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to the passenger. '3 In
the recent case of Husain v. Olympic Airways, 4 the Ninth Circuit
broadly applied the "accident" definition. The court held that a
passenger's pre-existing medical condition, which may have
been aggravated by a flight attendant's failure to move the passenger, constituted an "accident. ''5 The court expanded the Supreme Court's definition to include the aggravation of a preexisting condition, and made tenuous assumptions regarding
the proximate cause of the passenger's injury. Had the Ninth
Circuit followed the Supreme Court's definition of "accident,"
which excludes the passenger's own internal reactions to norT

* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2005; B.A., University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign; Master of Arts-University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign.
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 137
L.N.T.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 40105 (West 2003) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention]. For purposes of this case note, references will primarily be made to
Article 17.
2 Id. at art. 17.
3 Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405 (1985).
4 Husain v. Olympic Airways, 116 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1123 (N.D. Cal. 2000),
affd, 316 F.3d 829 (9th Cir. 2002), affd 124 S. Ct. 1221 (2004).
5 Husain, 316 F.3d at 838-39.
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mal operations, and reasonably applied proximate cause, it
would have reversed the Northern District of California's
decision.
Dr. Abid M. Hanson had asthma, for which he used an inhaler, and food allergies.6 Dr. Hanson had previously suffered
other serious attacks, related to both of his pre-existing conditions.7 For example, Dr. Hanson suffered a near-fatal breathing
attack. Experts at trial determined that the likely cause of the
attack was Dr. Hanson's food allergy, even though he was in a
smoky restaurant and ate minimal food.' In the instant case, Dr.
Hanson and his family traveled between San Francisco and
Cairo, connecting through both New York and Athens. Though
the family had not initially realized that smoking was allowed on
the flight, the family requested non-smoking seats, which were
accommodated on both the outbound and inbound trips.9
After securing non-smoking boarding passes for the family's
return trip, Ms. Husain'° presented the ticket agent with medical documentation of Dr. Hanson's asthma. Dr. Hanson first experienced breathing difficulties in a smoky waiting area during a
layover in Athens. As a result, Dr. Hanson repeatedly used his
inhaler in the Athens airport. 1 The family boarded the
Olympic Airways flight and noticed they were seated in row 48;
the smoking section began at row 51.12 Ms. Husain asked the
flight attendant to reseat Dr. Hanson, but the flight attendant
told Ms. Husain to return to her seat. After everyone had
boarded the plane, Ms. Husain again asked the flight attendant
to move Dr. Hanson, due to his allergy. Ms. Husain was told the
flight was "totally full.' 13 Immediately after takeoff, the smoke
began to filter through the cabin. Ms. Husain immediately
urged the flight attendant to reseat Dr. Hanson. The flight attendant refused two different times, but told Ms. Husain she
could ask other passengers to switch seats. Ms. Husain chose
6 Husain v. Olympic Airways, 316 F.2d 829 (9th Cir. 2002), affg 116 F. Supp. 2d
1121, 1123 (N.D. Cal. 2000), affd 124 S. Ct. 1221 (2004).
7 Husain, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 1124.
8 Id. A second food-related attack occurred less than six months prior to this
flight. Id.
9 Id. at 1124-25.
10 Ms. Husain is Dr. Hanson's wife. Id. at 1123.
11 Id.

Id.
Id. at 1125. A review determined that the flight was not completely full.
There were eleven empty seats, including two business class seats. Id. at 1126.
12
13

2004]

HUSAIN V OLYMPIC AIRWAYS

187

not to seek this self-help remedy and returned to her seat.14
Roughly two hours later, the meal service arrived and Dr. Hanson consumed some portion of the food. Following the meal,
he asked for another inhaler and went to the front of the aircraft for some fresh air. Upon reaching the front of the aircraft,
he motioned for his epinephrine and shortly went into distress.
After two injections of epinephrine, he was unable to breathe on
his own and resuscitation efforts were ineffective. 5 Dr. Hanson
died on 1the
aircraft, and no autopsy was performed for religious
6
reasons.

Husain filed the initial wrongful death action against Olympic
Airways in the California Superior Court for Alameda County on
December 24, 1998, alleging that Dr. Hanson's death resulted
from an "accident" under the Warsaw Convention. 7 Olympic
Airways removed the case to the Northern District of California
and unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment, claiming that
Dr. Hanson's death was the result of a pre-existing medical condition, not an "accident." After a bench trial, the plaintiffs were
awarded $1,400,000, which was reduced by fifty percent due to
comparative negligence. Final judgment and additional court
findings were entered on November 28, 2000. These conclusions provided an additional $700,000 in non-pecuniary damages, based on California state law. Appeal to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals followed."
The Ninth Circuit relied on Air France9 in determining
whether an "accident" occurred in the Olympic Airways incident. The court noted that when a passenger reacts to the normal operations of an aircraft, there is no "accident. ' 20 However,

the court determined that this situation was factually distinct,
holding that the negligence of the crew was the unusual and

Id.
Id. at 1126-27.
16 Id. at 1128.
17 Husain, 316 F.3d at 832.
18 Id. The initial damage award of $1,400,000 exceeded the $75,000 statutory
limit imposed by the Warsaw Convention because the court found willful misconduct, which excluded the liability limit under Article 25. Id. at 839, 841; Warsaw
Convention, supra note 1, at art. 25(1).
19 This case "conclude [d] that liability under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention arises only if a passenger's injury is caused by an unexpected or unusual
event or happening that is external to the passenger." AirFrance,470 U.S. at 405.
20 Husain, 316 F.3d at 835-36 (quoting Air France, 470 U.S. at 406).
14
15
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unexpected occurrence,
and this "accident" proximately caused
21
Dr. Hanson's death.

The Ninth Circuit discussed the argument that crew negligence characterizes an "accident" since it is both external to the
passenger and an unexpected occurrence in the course of
travel. The court distinguished two cases, holding that pre-existing conditions, potentially aggravated by flight attendant
omissions, were not "accidents" under the Warsaw Convention. 22 In Abramson v. Japan Airlines Co., 23 the flight attendant
refused to offer a place for the plaintiff to lie down to alleviate
pains associated with a pre-existing hiatal hernia. The flight attendant said there were no available seats, yet it was later determined that there were nine empty seats in first-class. The
plaintiff alleged that the denial of a place to exercise his selfhelp remedy aggravated his condition and caused him to be hospitalized. 24 The court concluded "that the alleged acts and
omissions of JAL and its employees during the routine flight...
do not constitute an 'accident'. .",25
In addition, the court
distinguished Krys v. Lufthansa German Airlines.2 6 In Krys, the

plaintiff did not feel well (later confirmed to be a heart attack)
and, after seeking advice from a passenger doctor, the airplane
continued to its destination without making an unscheduled
landing. The plaintiff alleged that the crew was negligent for
27
not landing the plane early, which aggravated his injuries.
The Eleventh Circuit held that the failure to make an unscheduled landing in this situation 2was not unusual or unexpected, and thus, not an "accident.

The Ninth Circuit found that the above-cited cases were factually distinct from the present case. The court noted that in Krys,
the Lufthansa employees relied on an erroneous determination
from a medical doctor. Therefore, the employees did not believe that an immediate unscheduled landing was necessary.29
Id. at 837-39.
Id. at 836.
23 Abramson v. Japan Airlines Co., 739 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1984), overruled on
other grounds by El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 176 (1999) (holding that the Warsaw Convention is the only personal injury remedy available to a
plaintiff that was in the process of embarking, disembarking, or on an aircraft).
24 Id. at 131.
25 Id. at 133.
26 Krys v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 119 F.3d 1515 (11th Cir. 1997).
27 Id. at 1517.
28 Id. at 1522.
29 Husain, 316 F.3d at 837.
21
22
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The court distinguished Abramson by noting that the passenger
never told JAL of the medical condition and, therefore, JAL did
not know that immediate action was required." The district
court also distinguished two non-"accident" cases"1 because the
passengers did not seek flight attendant assistance.3 2 The district court contrasted these cases with the instant case and noted
that Ms. Husain repeatedly informed the flight attendant of the
seriousness of the situation and, despite this information, the
33
flight attendant still failed to act.

The Ninth Circuit relied on the district court's findings that
the flight attendant's failure to act with knowledge of the medical necessity was a "blatant disregard of industry standards and
airline policies. 31 4 The district court had relied on other courts'
opinions35 to support the conclusion that negligence of the crew
may be characterized as an "accident. '3 6 The Ninth Circuit
found no clear error in the district court's conclusion that
"[t] he failure to act in the face of a known serious risk satisfies
the meaning of 'accident'. . so long as reasonable alternatives
exist that would substantially minimize the risk and these alternatives would not unreasonably interfere with the normal, expected operation of the airplane."3 "
Further, the Ninth Circuit held that the injury/death was
proximately caused by the "accident, '38 which is another requirement imposed by Air France.39 The Ninth Circuit determined that there was no clear error in the district court's
conclusion that it was more likely that Dr. Hanson's death re30 Id.
31 Warshaw v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 442 F. Supp. 400, 412-13 (E.D. Pa.
1977) (holding that the normal pressurization of the aircraft, which resulted in
deafness in the passenger's ear, was not an "accident"); Gotz v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 199, 204-05 (D. Mass. 1998) (holding that placing luggage in
the overhead bin, which fell and injured that passenger under the watchful eye of
a flight attendant, was not an "accident").
32 Husain, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 1132.

33 Id.

Husain, 316 F.3d at 837 (citing Husain, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 1134).
Fishman v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 132 F.3d 138, 142 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding
that applying a scalding compress to a child's ear, which caused injury, was an
"accident"); Carey v. United Airlines, Inc., 77 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (D. Ore.
1999) (holding that a heated exchange with a passenger, advising him of his
rights, and preventing seat changes constituted an "accident").
36 Husain, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 1131.
37 Husain, 316 F.3d at 837.
38 Id. at 839.
39 Air France,470 U.S. at 405-06.
34
35
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sulted from smoke inhalation rather than from his food allergies. The court reasoned, based on Air France, that the
"accident" only needs to be a "link in the chain, ' 40 and found
that the flight attendant's failure to reseat Dr. Hanson constituted that link.4 1
The Husain court incorrectly applied the "accident" definition found in Air France. A pre-existing injury or illness has not
been held to constitute an "accident" by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court, in Air France, commented that American
decisions have "refuse[d] to extend the term ["accident"] to
cover routine travel procedures that produce an injury due to
the peculiar internal condition of a passenger." 42 To circumvent this requirement, the Ninth Circuit focused on the alleged
negligence of the flight attendant. The court determined that
the flight attendant's failure to reseat was the unexpected occurrence and, thus, an "accident." However, it is not clear that the
flight attendant was ever aware of the medical emergency, much
like in the Abramson case. Rather, the flight attendant was faced
with a potentially irate passenger sitting near the smoking section who wanted to be moved because of allergies. It is likely
that a flight attendant is constantly faced with those requests
from the unlucky passengers sitting near the smoking section. If
the flight attendant were to reseat each of those passengers on
every flight, reseating would turn into a full-time flight attendant
job. It is true that Ms. Husain presented some notice of asthma
to the Olympic Airways' check-in agent. 43 There is no evidence,
however, that the check-in agent made the flight attendant or
other crew members aware of any medical issue or whether the
note referenced a critical medical issue rather than simply mentioning the passenger's asthma. Regardless, Olympic Airways
complied with the request for a non-smoking seat, which was the
initial concern. This failure to reseat should not be considered
an "accident" under the Warsaw Convention. Further, the
"new" negligence standard broadens the "accident" definition
and will subject airlines to additional litigation.
This broadened "accident" definition incorporates "reasonable alternatives"4 4 to support the negligence standard. This expanded definition would likely bring the Abramson case into
Id. at 406.
Husain, 316 F.3d at 838.
42 Air France, 470 U.S. at 405.
43 Husain, 316 F.3d at 833.
44 Id. at 837.
40
41
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question, as it is likely that there were reasonable alternatives
available to the flight attendant (first-class seats) to help manage
the pain of the passenger's hernia. The Supreme Court,
though, referenced Abramson as being consistent with other
American and international courts in defining "accident."45
The addition of "reasonable alternatives" leads to further unintended results under the Warsaw Convention. For example, if
someone is overweight and cannot comfortably fit into a regular
economy-class seat, he may request reseating. In fact, it is conceivable he would explain that the seat would pinch his nerves
and cause a problem. If there were an available first-class seat, it
may be considered a reasonable alternative to place him in that
seat. If the flight attendant fails to reseat the passenger in the
available first-class seat and the smaller economy seat pinches a
nerve and causes major injury to his leg, this injury could be

considered an "accident" under the Warsaw Convention. The
flight attendant knew that there was a risk of injury and the failure to act caused the injury because it would not, or might not,
have occurred in the first-class seat (the reasonable alternative).
Though this example is extreme, it illustrates the absurd result
that could occur under this standard and the potentially costly
economic effects on the airlines if economy passengers could
find a way to sit in first-class at an economy rate.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit erroneously concluded that the failure to act was the proximate cause of Dr. Hanson's injury/
death. There was no definitive finding whether the cause of Dr.
Hanson's death was an allergic reaction to eating food, or the
second-hand smoke. In fact, the Ninth Circuit determined it was
simply plausible that Dr. Hanson died from second-hand
smoke. 46 This is mere speculation. In fact, it is more likely that
the food allergy caused the death, given that the circumstances
appeared similar to both of Dr. Hanson's prior documented
food-allergy attacks. In this case, he ate the food and shortly
thereafter, he had an attack. He had been sitting in the smoking section for well over two hours when he had the attack.
Contrary to the district court's finding, there is no indication
that moving Dr. Hanson would have changed his fate. Dr. Hanson already had a problem that day before ever boarding the
aircraft. He had repeatedly used his inhaler while waiting in the
Athens airport. It is certainly possible that the cause of his death
45 Air France,470 U.S. at 404-05.
46

Husain, 316 F.3d at 839.
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was the result of his body's reaction to that smoke and the food
he ate. It is mere speculation whether the failure to reseat (the
"accident") was a "link in the chain" causing Dr. Hanson's
death. These assumptions broaden the proximate cause element. This reasoning would allow an individual plaintiff to
speculate as to why an injury occurred, thus satisfying the proximate cause element. This would also subject the airlines to
more litigation.
Aggravation of a pre-existing injury, based on a negligence
standard, should not be considered an "accident" within the definition articulated by the Supreme Court.4 7 This articulated definition has been greatly expanded by this case. Not only has the
"accident" definition been extended to a failure to act situation,
but also, the proximate cause requirement has been tenuously
applied. Other passengers will merely have to show some possible causation of an act, or failure to act, to be able to recover
from the airlines. Although comparative negligence reduced
the award by fifty percent, 48 the court's holding allows for more
findings of "accidents" under the Warsaw Convention. This definition extension would dramatically increase litigation costs
and contribute to an already crippled airline industry.49
47 Air France, 470 U.S. at 405.
48

Husain, 316 F.3d at 832.

- Just before publication of this journal, the Supreme Court issued a ruling in
Olympic Airways v. Husain, 124 S. Ct. 1221 (2004). The Supreme Court affirmed
the Ninth Circuit's opinion. Because Olympic Airways failed to challenge the
finding that the flight attendant's conduct was "unusual or unexpected" based on
the industry and company standards, the Supreme Court simply assumed it was
an "unusual or unexpected" happening in affirming the Ninth Circuit's opinion.
The Court acknowledged that it appeared the Ninth Circuit developed a negligence-based approach by focusing on the flight attendant's failure to follow industry and company practice or failure to reseat. However, the Court stated that
neither party disagreed with the fact that the flight attendant's actions were both
"unexpected and unusual," which was the standard developed in Air France.
Therefore, the appropriate standard was applied in the case and the conduct of
the flight attendant fell within the meaning of "accident" in Article 17 of the
Warsaw Convention.
Though the Court discounts the negligence standard developed in the Ninth
Circuit, the Court has broadened the "accident" definition in this opinion. The
Court has now allowed "inaction" on the part of a flight crew to be an "accident"
under the Warsaw Convention. As Justice Scalia commented in dissent, the other
signatories to the Convention have rejected this argument and have specifically
referenced it as a non-event. In fact, one court even relied on the Abramson opinion in reaching its conclusion. The Court's decision has distinguished the
United States from other signatories to the Convention. Additionally, the Court
failed to discuss whether the flight attendant's failure to seat actually was a cause
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of the injury. In dissent, Justice Scalia commented on this very issue and it is
mentioned in the case note above.
This opinion continues to open the door wider to lawsuits. An individual only
has to show a slight link to an injury (possibly not even a causal link) when someone in the flight crew fails to provide something. Based on the Supreme Court's
opinion, if the flight crew failed to reseat someone, who they knew had a medical
issue and the industry or company practice was to reseat in an available seat (or it
was a "reasonable alternative"), this would be considered an "accident." That
means that someone who may have a pinched nerve condition in an economy
seat who isn't reseated in an available first-class seat would likely prevail, as is
mentioned in the above case note. In the future, the international airlines may
be flying passengers just to pay for all the litigation costs, rather than to keep the
airline in business.
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